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We investigate a fundamental property of device independent security in quantum cryptography
by characterizing probability distributions which are necessarily independent of the measurement
results of any eavesdropper. We show that probability distributions that are secure in this sense are
exactly the extremal quantum probability distributions. This allows us to give a characterization
of security in algebraic terms. We apply the method to common examples for two-party as well as
multi-party setups and present a scheme for verifying security of probability distributions with two
parties, two measurement settings, and two outcomes.
The idea of using quantum systems for secure commu-
nication has been around for more than 25 years now.
But still the boundaries of quantum cryptography have
not been fully understood. Only recently a remarkable
feature of quantum systems has been realized, namely
that observed violations of a Bell inequality may imply
cryptographic security, even if the measurements that
lead to the violation are unknown to legitimate parties.
This principle goes under the name “device independent
security” and has been proven against collective attacks
[1], and recently against arbitrary attacks for memory-
less measurement devices [2, 3]. But still no proof for
the most general situation is known. In this paper we
focus on the question, when measurement outcomes ob-
tained by the legitimate parties are independent of mea-
surements performed by an eavesdropper. We give a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for this under the assump-
tion that the probability distributions are known without
error.
We consider a quantum correlation experiment with
N separated parties, each performing one of M differ-
ent local measurements with K outcomes. We denote
this situation by the triple (N,M,K). In a device in-
dependent scenario the parties (usually N=2) want to
extract a secret key from the observed correlations in
which the security estimation is solely based on the mea-
sured probability distributions. There are no assumption
on the proper functioning of the measurement devices or
the measured system, e.g., on their dimension. Proba-
bility distributions that are useful for cryptography have
to feature certain properties. First, the obtained corre-
lations should not permit a local hidden variable (LHV)
model as in this case a potential adversary can have full
knowledge about the correlations. Second, the correla-
tions should only be weakly correlated to any possible
measurement of an adversary. The first property is well
known to be equivalent to violate a Bell inequality (see
below), but the latter still lacks a concrete characteriza-
tion.
In this paper we address this problem by specifying
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all probability distributions which do not allow a LHV
model and are provably statistically independent of the
knowledge of any eavesdropper. We show that these
probability distributions, which we call secure, can com-
pletely be characterized in geometric terms. Indeed in the
convex body Q of all quantum probability distributions
the secure points are precisely the non-classical extremal
points, i.e., those which are not deterministic and can-
not be obtained as proper convex combination of other
points in Q.
The characterization of extremal points in Q is of gen-
eral interest and numerical approaches to determine them
are known [4, 5]. In our examples, we provide and dis-
cuss different tools to certify, respectively, find extremal
probability distributions for particular (N,M,K)-cases.
In many situations it turns out to be easier to establish a
stronger property, i.e., that the algebraic structure of the
measurement operators is completely determined by the
probability distributions. This also leads to a stronger
notion of security. The most prominent example (see ex-
ample 3) are correlations which maximally violate the
Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH)-inequality [6].
Our results have links to previous results obtained in
the framework of non-signaling correlations, i.e., theories
that are more general than quantum theory. One direc-
tion of our result, namely that extremality implies secu-
rity was proven in [7] for non-signalling theories in the
bipartite case. In this paper, we only discuss the quan-
tum framework, although our proofs can in principle be
adapted to any non-signaling theory.
Definitions. For simplicity, we consider the general
(N,M,K) case, even though the results are also valid for
different numbers of measurement settings and outcomes
for each party. We denote the probability for obtaining
a string of outcomes x = (x1, ..., xN ) given a string of
measurement settings s = (s1, ..., sN ) by P(x|s). These
numbers are assumed to be known exactly, i.e., we do
not consider the uncertainties involved in estimating such
probabilities from a finite sample.
The set of probability distributions P conform to a
LHV model, i.e., which can be realized by assuming the
measurements reveal outcomes whose probabilities are
predetermined, is called the set C of classical correla-
tions. It is a polytope, i.e. generated by a finite number
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2of extremal points, which are given by the assignment
of definite outcomes to each measurement. The faces (of
maximal dimension) correspond to inequalities, which are
linear in P, and are called (tight) Bell inequalities. In the
(2, 2, 2) case all tight Bell inequalities are equivalent to
the CHSH inequality [8]. A survey about Bell inequalities
and further references can be found in [9]
We are interested in the set Q of quantum correlations,
which is defined as the set of all probability distributions
P that can be realized by a quantum representation
P(x|s) = tr(ρF (x|s)), (1)
where ρ is a density operator on a Hilbert space H ,
whose dimension is not constrained and can be infinite,
and F (x|s) = F1(x1|s1) · · ·FN (xN |sN ) is a product of
commuting operators on H . {Fi(x|s)}x are the mea-
surement operators of the observable chosen by the ith
party according to the measurement setting s. Thus the
Fi(x|s) are positive operators satisfying
∑K
x=1 Fi(x|s) =
1, and have to commute for different sites, since the par-
ties are independent. As shown in Appendix A, every P
which can be realized in this way can also be realized in a
simplified “standard” form, in which ρ = |Ω〉〈Ω| is a pure
state and the operators Fi(x|s) are projections. More-
over, in the standard form |Ω〉 is cyclic for the algebra
A(F ), which is obtained from the Fi(x|s) by taking prod-
ucts, linear combinations and limits of expectation val-
ues. Cyclic means that the vectors A|Ω〉 with A ∈ A(F )
span a dense subspace in H .
The set Q is a closed convex set which has in contrast
to C a continuum of extremal points (see for instance
[10]). Bell inequalities define the boundary between C
and Q. The set Q can be characterized similarly by in-
equalities that are linear in P, satisfied by all P ∈ Q and
tight for at least one P ∈ Q. We call them Tsirelson in-
equalities. For every linear expression in P there is a max-
imum on C, and another, usually larger one on Q which
leads to a Tsirelson inequality. Computational methods
to derive such maximal violations in Q are derived in
[4, 5]. For the CHSH expression in the (2, 2, 2)-case these
maxima are 2 [6] and 2
√
2 [11], respectively. The value 4
is achieved on the set of “no-signalling correlations” P, de-
fined by the property that the measurement of one party
does not change the probabilities observed by another.
Similar to C, P is generated by finitely many extremal
points [7]. It holds with proper inclusion C ⊂ Q ⊂ P.
Secure probability distributions. We model the eaves-
dropper by another quantum party, whose measurements
must commute with all F (x|s). Accordingly, we call a
probability distribution P secure, if P does not factor-
ize, i.e., P(x|s) 6= ∏Nj=1 Pj(xj |sj), and for any quantum
representation and any operator E commuting with all
Fi(xi|si)
tr
(
ρEF (x|s)
)
= tr(ρE)P(x|s). (2)
The operator E represents all possible measurements an
eavesdropper could perform. The requirement that P is
not a product is necessary to exclude classical determin-
istic points, i.e. the extremal points of C, for which (2) is
satisfied trivially. As we will see, this excludes all proba-
bility distributions which can be realized in LHV models.
In device independent cryptography, our definition en-
sures that an attack of an eavesdropper can never be
better than a classical guess. The number of extractable
secure bits by classical postprocessing can then be char-
acterized by the classical smooth min-entropy [12].
Our first main result gives a geometric interpretation
of secure probability distributions: A probability distri-
bution P is secure, if and only if it is extremal in Q\C.
The argument is straightforward. Suppose, P is se-
cure, but not extremal. Then there exists a direct
sum representation and a convex decomposition with
P = λP1 + (1 − λ)P2, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Now use the defini-
tion (2) with E being the projector onto the first/second
summand to get P = P1 and P = P2. This shows that the
convex combination is indeed trivial and P is extremal.
As all extremal correlations in C are of product form, it
follows that P /∈ C. Conversely, suppose P is extremal
and P /∈ C. As before, we can conclude that P cannot
be of product form. Take any commuting 0 < E < 1
and set λ = tr(ρE). Define P1 = (1/λ)tr(ρEF (x|s))
and P2 = (1/(1 − λ))tr(ρ(1 − E)F (x|s)) such that P =
λP1 + (1− λ)P2. As P is extremal, it holds that P = P1,
which is just equation (2), so P is secure.
To decide whether a given probability distribution is
secure has now been reduced to certifying extremality
in Q. This is in general a hard problem. Even in the
(2, 2, 2)-case no simple algebraic constraints are known
to verify extremality of a given P. In this paper, we will
provide an explicit, yet limited certification scheme in
example 3.
Algebraically secure probability distributions. There is
a straightforward way to strengthen the definition of se-
cure probability distributions by extending the factoriza-
tion property to a larger set of observables. The reason
is that the stronger notion of security is often easier to
verify.
A probability distribution P is called algebraically se-
cure, if it is secure and for any quantum representation
and any operator E commuting with all Fi(xi|si)
tr
(
ρEF˜
)
= tr(ρE) tr(ρF˜ ), (3)
for all F˜ ∈ A(F ).
They are characterized as follows: A probability distri-
bution P is algebraically secure, if and only if it is ex-
tremal in Q\C and has a unique quantum representation,
up to unitary equivalence.
A sketch of the proof goes as follows. Assume first
that P is algebraically secure, and therefore extremal.
Let ρ = |Ω〉〈Ω| together with Fi(xi|si), and ρ′ = |Ω′〉〈Ω′|
with F ′i (xi|si) be two representations of P on suitable
Hilbert spaces H , H ′. Condition (3) implies that for
all corresponding operators F˜ ∈ A(F ) and F˜ ′ ∈ A(F ′),
3tr(ρF˜ ) = tr(ρ′F˜ ′). Otherwise, the direct sum represen-
tation with E chosen as the projector on the first or sec-
ond summand contradicts (3). Define then the unitary
operator U via UF˜ |Ω〉 = F˜ ′|Ω′〉 which transforms one
representation into the other. Because |Ω〉 and |Ω′〉 are
cyclic U can be extended to a unitary from H to H ′.
Conversely, assume that P is extremal and all represen-
tations are unitarily equivalent. Let 0 ≤ E ≤ 1 be an op-
erator commuting with all Fi(xi|si). Since P is extremal,
1
tr(ρE)
√
Eρ
√
E together with the operators Fi(xi|si) is a
valid quantum representation of P. Hence, E = 1, which
implies (3).
FIG. 1: Sketch of the set of quantum representations S
(above) and the set of probability distributions Q (below).
An extremal probability distribution can either correspond
to a unique point (a) or to a face of S (b). Other faces of S
can be mapped to faces of Q (c). Not all extremal points of
S are also extremal for Q (d).
Secure vs. algebraically secure. It is now interesting
to identify cases for which the notions of secure and al-
gebraically secure coincide. To formalize the question,
we can introduce a map Γ from all possible (unitary in-
equivalent) quantum representations S (= S(N,M,K))
to the set of probability distributions Q. The set S can
be considered as a convex set and the map Γ is linear
and surjective, but not injective. The extremal points of
S are exactly the irreducible quantum representations,
which are defined by the property that the only invari-
ant subspaces of A(F ) are {0} and H . As shown in
[13], each extremal probability distribution P ∈ Q ad-
mits an irreducible quantum representation. Hence, a
secure probability distribution P is algebraically secure if
and only if Γ−1(P) is exactly one extremal point in S. In
FIG. 1, the point (a) corresponds to an algebraically se-
cure probability distribution, while the point (b) and the
endpoints of the line (c) are secure, but not algebraically
secure.
In the following we discuss examples, for which we pro-
vide methods to find extremal points and criterions to
decide when they are also algebraically secure.
Example 1: The (N,2,2)-case. The algebraic struc-
ture of the (N, 2, 2)-case is quite well understood (see
e.g. [14] and references therein). All irreducible quan-
tum representations are in this case given on an N -
qubit subspace H = ⊗Ni=1C2 with an arbitrary pure
state ψ ∈ H and measurements, which are parameter-
ized by N angles θ1, ..., θN (θi ∈ [0, pi]). The measure-
ments are given at site i as Fi(1, 1) = 12 (1 + σ3) and
Fi(1, 2) =
1
2 (1 + sin(θi)σ1 + cos(θi)σ3), together with
their complements Fi(2, s) = 1−Fi(1, s). The σi denote
the Pauli matrices and we omitted the identities on the
tensor factors for the other parties. This parametriza-
tion in {θi} and ψ is sufficient to determine the whole
convex body Q. An arbitrary P is a direct sum of at
most 4N + 1 irreducible representations. Compare [15]
for an alternative deviation of these results.
In order to find extremal points and test algebraic
uniqueness we combine the above parametrization with
a maximization of a Tsirelson inequality. More explic-
itly, for each functional given by coefficients {c(x|s)},
we can ask for the maximal quantum violation, i.e.,
Qc := supP∈Q
∑
x,s c(x|s)P(x|s). In general, Qc can
be computed by a hierarchy of semi-definite programs
[4, 5]. Here, we follow another strategy by parameter-
izing the corresponding operator C =
∑
c(x|s)F (x|s) =
C(θ1, ..., θN ) by means of the irreducible representations.
The maximization of 〈ψ|C(θ1, ..., θN )|ψ〉 over all θi ∈
[0, pi) and ψ ∈ C2N yields Qc. Moreover, if there is ex-
actly one set of parameters θ1, ..., θN and a unique state
ψ for which the maximum is attained, the corresponding
probability distribution P is algebraically secure. In the
case where more than one possible choice of θ1, ..., θN , ψ
leads to a maximal violation, we can determine the con-
vex span of the corresponding probability distributions.
This corresponds to the face given by the intersection of
Q and the hyperplane {P | ∑x,s c(x|s)P(x|s) = Qc}. Ex-
tremal points of that face are extremal points of Q, and
thus, secure probability distributions.
As a straightforward application, one can deduce that
the probability distributions leading to maximal violation
of Mermin’s inequalities [16] are algebraically secure.
Example 2: Certificate of extremality in the (2,2,2)-
case. The idea of the foregoing example was to find ex-
tremal P’s by maximizing a given Tsirelson expression.
Here, we start with a particular P and want to construct
a Tsirelson inequality saturated by P. If there exists such
an inequality which is not trivial, i.e. cannot be saturated
by any LHV model, and no other probability distribution
in Q saturates it (or alternatively that just one quantum
representation of P exists), extremality of P is certified.
We focus on the (2,2,2)-case and discuss a method how
to construct a maximally violated Tsirelson expressions
for a given P. It comes along with a natural order of com-
plexity for which we solve the lowest order explicitly. The
main ingredient is again the parametrization of the irre-
ducible quantum representations by a state ψ ∈ C2 ⊗C2
and two angles θ = (θA, θB) (see previous example) for
which we denote the obtained probability distribution
by P(θ,ψ). Because we are only interested in extremal
Ps, it is sufficient to consider P(θ,ψ) with a real ψ (see
Appendix B). Since we have dichotomic measurements
4we can equivalently work with ±1 valued observables in-
stead of measurement operators. We denote the observ-
ables on Alice’s (Bob’s) side by A1, A2 (B1, B2) and set
A0 = B0 = 1.
Finding a Tsirelson inequality for P(θ,ψ) is equiva-
lent to the following task: Construct a positive oper-
ator T =
∑
k Pk(Ai, Bj)
†Pk(Ai, Bj), with Pk(Ai, Bj)
polynomials in Ai ⊗ Bj , i, j = 0, 1, 2, such that (i)
Pk(Ai(θA), Bj(θB))ψ0 = 0 for all k and (ii) T =∑2
i,j=0 tijAi⊗Bj for all possible observables inH . Here,
Ai(θA), Bj(θB) denote the observables of the represen-
tation (θ, ψ). Condition (ii) implies that T can be in-
terpreted as a linear functional of P, (i) that it is 0 for
P(θ,ψ), and the ansatz for T that T is a positive opera-
tor and thus its associated functional on P is positive for
each P ∈ Q.
In order to solve the problem a constraint on the
degree of the polynomials Pk in the ansatz for T has
to be imposed. This introduces a natural hierarchy,
where the order limits the possible P(θ,ψ) for which
the method succeeds. For the simplest ansatz, Pk =∑2
j=1(αkjAj ⊗ 1 − βkj1 ⊗ Bj) (αkj , βkj ∈ R), the
P for which a Tsirelson inequality can be constructed
are exactly the ones which correspond to a representa-
tion (φ±x , θA, θB) with maximally entangled state φ±x =
1√
2
(cosx,∓ sinx, sinx,± cosx) (x ∈ [0, pi)) for which
sin(2x) sin(2x± θB)
sin(2x− θA) sin(2x− θA ± θB) < 0
holds. The corresponding Tsirelson inequality and the
derivation can be found in Appendix B.
Example 3: The (2,M,2)-case for full correlations.
The difficulty of finding extremal points in the (2,M, 2)
scenario can be considerably reduced, as it is sufficient
to consider only full correlations. This was shown by
Tsirelson in [11] where he characterized all extremal
points. In the following let Ai, Bj , i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, de-
note±1 valued observables located by Alice and Bob, and
ρ a density operator. The set of quantum correlations
Qcor is given by all correlation tables cij = tr(AiBjρ)
which can be obtained by means of a quantum repre-
sentation. In [11] it was proven that all quantum rep-
resentations of an extremal correlation table which is
not deterministic have uniform marginal distributions
tr(Aiρ) = tr(Bjρ) = 0. Thus, non-deterministic ex-
tremal correlations inQcor correspond to secure probabil-
ity distributions in Q. Furthermore, an extremal correla-
tion table which allows just one quantum representation
gives rise to an algebraically secure point.
For every correlation table cij exists a so-called c-
system, that is, a collection of vectors xi, yj (i, j ∈
{1, . . . ,M}) with ||xi|| ≤ 1, ||yj || ≤ 1 in an Euclidian
space with dimension M , such that cij = 〈xi, yj〉. If
P is extremal, the corresponding c-systems are isomet-
ric to each other, ||xi|| = ||yj || = 1 and the linear hull
of the {xi} and {yj} coincide. Calling the dimension
of the linear hull the rank r of the c-system, it further
follows that {xi ⊗ xi, yj ⊗ yj} span the symmetric sub-
space of Rr⊗Rr. The following inequalities hold: r ≤M ,
r ≤ −1/2+√1/4 + 4M) and r(r+1)/2 ≤ 2M−1. There
are two cases to be distinguished. For c-systems with
even rank, the representation is unique (up to unitary
equivalence), while for c-systems with odd rank, there
are exactly two non-equivalent representations.
With this, the question of secure versus algebraically
secure is equivalent to determining the rank of the c-
system which corresponds to the given correlation ta-
ble. According to the inequalities above, it follows di-
rectly that all probability distributions in the (2, 2, 2) and
(2, 3, 2)-case which correspond to non-classical extremal
correlations in Qcor are algebraically secure.
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Appendix A: Standard Form of a Quantum
Representation
As described in the paper, we consider a general proba-
bility distribution obtained by N parties, havingM mea-
surements with K outcomes each. Let x ∈ {1, ..,K}
denote one local measurement outcome, s ∈ {1, ...,M}
one setting and x (s) denote the N -element strings of
outcomes (measurements) for all parties. We define a
probability distribution P to be quantum and thus ly-
ing in Q, if there exists a Hilbert space H together
with a state ρ and positive operator valued measures
{Fi(x, s)}Kx=1, i = 1, ..., N and s = 1, ...,M , such that
[Fi(x, s), Fj(x
′, s′)] = 0 for every i 6= j, and it holds that
P(x|s) = tr(ρF (x|s)), (A1)
where F (x, s) =
∏N
i=1 Fi(xi|si).
The goal is to show that for any such P one can find
a quantum representation in standard form, that is, a
representation which consists of projective measurements
and a pure cyclic state for A(F ). The proof is given by
an explicit construction.
First, we recapitulate the definition of A(F ) and what
it means that a vector is cyclic for A(F ). The alge-
bra generated by the operators Fi(x, s), A(F ), is de-
fined as the closure of the set of all linear combinations
of products of Fi(x, s), i.e. spanC{
∏m
l=1 Fil(xil |sil)|m ∈
N} ⊂ B(H ) with respect to taking expectation val-
ues (i.e., the weak* closure). This means that we
add every G ∈ B(H ) for which a sequence {Gj}
in spanC{
∏m
l=1 Fil(xil |sil)|m ∈ N} exists, such that
limk→∞ tr(ρGj) = tr(ρG) for every state ρ in H . In
mathematical terminology this is called a von Neumann
algebra [17]. We call now a pure state |Ω〉 cyclic forA(F ),
if the closure of {G|Ω〉|G ∈ A(F )} is the entire Hilbert
space H .
5We begin by turning the measurement operators
Fi(x|s) into projective ones, by applying a version of the
Naimark dilation successively to each observable Fi(·, s).
It suffices to do this for one of the observables, pro-
vided we verify that in this construction not only the re-
quired commutativity conditions are preserved, but also
the projection valuedness of any of the other measure-
ments. So in order to turn the observable Fi(·, s) in to
a projective measurement, we define the Hilbert space
Ĥ =
⊕K
x=1Hx, where each of the Hx is a copy of the
given Hilbert space H . We denote by Px the projec-
tion onto the summand with label x, and introduce the
isometry
V :H → Ĥ V φ =
⊕
x
√
Fi(x, s)φ.
Then we will set F̂i(x, s) = Px, so that V ∗F̂i(x, s)V =
Fi(x, s). For other observables at the same site, e.g.,
Fi(·, r) with r 6= s, we set
F̂i(x, r) =
{
V Fi(1, r)V
∗ + (1− V V ∗) for x = 1
V Fi(x, r)V
∗ for x > 1
Because V is an isometry, we again have V ∗F̂i(x, r)V =
Fi(x, r) for all x. With V ∗ we denote the adjoint operator
of V . Moreover, F̂i(x, r)2 = V Fi(x, r)2V ∗ for x > 1 and
F̂i(1, r)
2 = V Fi(1, r)
2V ∗ + (1 − V V ∗), so that a projec-
tive measurement remains projective. For observables at
all other sites j 6= i we take F̂j(x, r) =
⊕
x′ Fj(x, r), i.e.,
as the original observable acting the same on each of the
summands. Once again, this preserves projective valued-
ness, and not only satisfies V ∗F̂j(x, r)V = Fj(x, r), but
even the stronger relation F̂j(x, r)V = V Fj(x, r). With
this relation it is easy to see that the F̂j(x, r) for different
j (possibly = i) commute, so we can form the product
F̂ (x|s) unambiguously, and that V ∗F̂ (x|s)V = F (x|s).
Hence if we define the state ρˆ = V ρV ∗, we obtain a
quantum representation of the same point P ∈ Q, with
F̂i(·, s) projective measurements.
In order to turn ρ into a pure and cyclic state we
can do the Gelfand-Naimark-Segal (GNS) construction
(Theorem 2.3.16 in [17]) of the algbra A(F ) with re-
spect to the state ρ. We consider A(F ) together with
the positive semidefinite sesquilinear form defined by
〈A|B〉 = tr(ρA∗B) as a pre-Hilbert space. To get a
Hilbert space we first take the quotient with respect to
the left ideal I = {A ∈ A(F )|tr(ρA∗A) = 0} and then
the completion with respect to the scalar product 〈·|·〉.
We denote the obtained Hilbert space by Ĥ and its el-
ements (in the densely defined subspace) are given by
the equivalence classes ψA = {A˜|A˜ = A + J, J ∈ I} for
A ∈ A(F ). We define the representation pi of A(F ) on
Ĥ by the equation pi(A)ψB = ψAB for A,B ∈ A(F ).
This representation is a *-homomorphism, that is, it re-
spects products and the adjoint operation. Hence, the
operators F̂i(x|s) = pi
(
Fi(x|s)
)
satisfy the same commu-
tation relation as Fi(x|s) and furthermore, projections
are mapped onto projections. If we set Ω = ψ1, we have
that 〈Ω|F̂ (x|s)Ω〉 = tr(ρF (x|s)) = P(x|s). We therefore
found a quantum representation of P given by F̂i(x|s)
and a pure state |Ω〉 which is by definition cyclic.
Appendix B: Lowest Order of the (2,2,2)-Certificate
The goal is to check extremality for a given P in the
(2,2,2)-case. We use the same notation as introduced in
the example 2 in the paper. Since we are only inter-
ested in extremal P in Q, we can restrict to the ones
which belong to an irreducible quantum representation
(see example 1 in the paper). They are described in a
Hilbert space H = C2 ⊗ C2 and parameterized by a
state ψ ∈ H and angles θA, θB ∈ [0, pi], which spec-
ify the ±1-valued observables A1, A2 and B1, B2 on Al-
ice‘s and Bob‘s side. The concrete form of the observ-
ables are given by Ai(θA) =
∑
j t(θA)ijXj and Bi(θB) =∑
j t(θB)ijXj with X1 = σ1, X2 = σ3 and
t(θ) =
(
0 1
sin θ cos θ
)
.
Because the observables are all real, an extremal P al-
ways allows a representation with a real ψ. To see this,
we can write ψ = φ + iη with φ, η real vectors in H .
Note that if (ψ, θA, θB) generates P so does (ψ¯, θA, θB),
with ψ¯ the complex conjugate of ψ. Hence, the state
ρ = 12 (|ψ〉〈ψ| + |ψ¯〉〈ψ¯|) = 12 (|φ〉〈φ| + |η〉〈η|) together
with θA, θB generates the same P. But if P is extremal
then also (φ, θA, θB) and (η, θA, θB) generates P, thus,
the state can be chosen to be real.
Moreover, the case sin θ = 0 corresponds to the case
where the observables at Alice‘s or Bob‘s side commute,
which corresponds to P which can be generated by a LHV
model. Hence, we restrict our attention to representa-
tions with a real ψ and θ 6= 0, pi.
We want to construct T =
∑2
i=1 Pi(Ak, Bl)
†Pi(Ak, Bl)
with
Pi =
2∑
j=1
(αijAj ⊗ 1− βij1⊗Bj) (B1)
where α and β are matrices in M2(C), such that the
conditions
(i) Pi(Al(θA), Bj(θB))ψ = 0 for i = 1, 2
(ii) T =
∑2
i,j=0 cijAi ⊗ Bj for all possible observables
Ai, Bj in H
are satisfied. Note that a possible observable Ai has to
satisfy A∗i = Ai and A2i = 1.
The restricted form of Pi limits the possible irre-
ducible representation for which the method applies,
which means that it is not always possible to find co-
efficients α, β such that condition (i) and (ii) are satis-
fied. The goal is to determine for which representations
6this can be done and derive the corresponding Tsirelson
inequality.
We start by analyzing condition (i). Using the particu-
lar form of the observables Ai(θA) and Bj(θB) expressed
through t(θ), we find that Piψ = 0, i = 1, 2, results in
[Xi ⊗ 1]ψ =
∑
j
ηij [1⊗Xj ]ψ (i = 1, 2) (B2)
where η = t(θA)−1α−1βt(θB). We assumed here that
α is invertible. However, this is not a restriction since
otherwise the state ψ is of product form.
In the following it is convenient to use the iso-
morphism between H and the Hilbert space M2(C)
with the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product. States φ =
(φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4) in H are identified with matrices
φˆ =
(
φ1 φ2
φ3 φ4
)
and [A⊗1]φ (resp. [1⊗B]φ) can be written as Aφˆ (resp.
φˆBT ). Moreover, we have that φ is a purification of the
density matrix ρ = (φˆ∗φˆ)T on C2. Equation (B2) is then
equivalent to
Xiψˆ =
∑
j
ηijψˆXj . (B3)
The following assertion characterizes condition (i): ψ
admits an η such that (B2) is satisfied if and only if
ψˆTψ ∝ 1. Then, it holds that
ηij =
1
2
tr(ψˆ−1XiψˆXj). (B4)
The proof goes as follows. First, we note that ψˆ must
be invertible. This is due to the fact that otherwise the
reduced state of ψ given by (ψˆ∗ψˆ)T has determinant 0
and is therefore a pure state. We then multiply equation
(B3) with Xkψˆ−1 from the left to find
∑
j ηijXkXj =
Xkψˆ
−1Xiψˆ. Recalling that tr(XkXj) = 2δkj , we can
take the trace and obtain (B4).
We turn now to the first part of the statement. Mul-
tiplication from the right of (B3) with ψˆ−1 shows that
Xi =
∑
j ηijψˆXjψˆ
−1. Thus, we obtain that
tr(XiXk) =
∑
j,l
ηijηkltr(XjXl),
from which follows that ηηT = 1. On the other hand
one can check that the set G of all ψˆ for which there
exists a η such that (B2) holds and det(ψˆ) = 1, describes
a group together with the usual matrix multiplication.
Moreover, the map ψˆ 7→ η(ψˆ) induced by (B4) is a group
homomorphism such that η(ψˆT ) = η−1. From this we
can then conclude that ψˆT ψˆ ∝ 1 is the necessary and
sufficient condition to solve (B2).
Because condition (i) is satisfied if and only if 1
det ψˆ
ψˆ
is an orthogonal matrix, the possible states ψ are param-
eterized by
φ±x =
1√
2
(cosx,∓ sinx, sinx,± cosx) (B5)
where x ∈ [0, pi). The state ψ determines the correspond-
ing η uniquely through equation (B4).
Since the reduced state of ψ is equal to (ψˆ∗ψˆ)T , it
follows directly that φ±x is maximally entangled. From
this follows also that the expectation values of all local
observables Al and Bj vanish.
FIG. 2: The plot shows the ratio r between the maximal
quantum and classical violation of the Tsirelson inequality
(B6) corresponding to (ψ = φ+x , θA = pi2 , θB) for θB ∈ (0, pi)
and x ∈ (0, pi/4). The domain is restricted due to condition
(B7). The quotient r exhibits a pi/4-periodic behavior in x
and the peak of
√
2 at x = pi/8 and θB = pi/2 corresponds to
a CHSH inequality.
We turn now to condition (ii) and compute the expec-
tation value of T with respect to φ ∈H ,
〈T 〉φ =tr(α∗α+ β∗β)
−
∑
j,k
(α∗β + (β∗α)T )jk〈Aj ⊗Bk〉φ
+
∑
j 6=k
((α∗α)jk〈AjAk〉φ + (β∗β)jk〈BjBk〉φ).
7Thus, condition (ii) requires that the matrices α∗α and
β∗β are diagonal. In this case the Tsirelson inequality
reads∑
j,k
(α∗β + (β∗α)T )jk〈Aj ⊗Bk〉 ≤ tr(α∗α+ β∗β). (B6)
The coefficients cij in condition (ii) are therefore cjk =
(α∗β + (β∗α)T )jk for j, k = 1, 2, c00 = −tr(α∗α + β∗β),
and the others 0.
Since the expectation value of T is invariant under
scaling and simultaneous unitary transformation of α
and β, we can without loss of generality assume that
α = diag(1, λ) with λ > 0. This can always be
achieved by the polar decomposition. Using now that
η = t(θA)
−1α−1βt(θB) we can write β = αγ with
γ = t(θA)ηt(θB)
−1. The condition that β∗β is diagonal
is then equivalent to
λ2 = −γ11γ12
γ21γ22
> 0, (B7)
which completely characterizes condition (ii).
Let us now summarize the results from the discus-
sions of the two conditions. Condition (i) says that
the only states ψ for which the method applies are of
the form (B5). Hence, we can constrain to represen-
tations (ψ, θA, θB) with ψ = φ±x . For these states we
can compute η via equation (B4), and insert it into
γ = t(θA)ηt(θB)
−1 to find that
γ±x =
1
sin θB
( ± sin(2x± θB) ∓ sin(2x)
± sin(2x− θA ± θB) ∓ sin(2x− θA)
)
Condition (B7) can then be computed to be
(λ±x )
2 = − sin(2x) sin(2x± θB)
sin(2x− θA) sin(2x− θA ± θB) > 0.
Provided that the inequality is satisfied, the method
applies and we can compute α = diag(1, λ) and β = αγ
from which the Tsirelson inequality (B6) can be deter-
mined. Expressed in λ±x , one finds that
α∗β + (β∗α)T =
2
sin θB
(
± sin(2x±θB) ∓ sin(2x)
±(λ±x )2 sin(2x−θA±θB) ∓(λ±x )2 sin(2x−θA)
)
and
tr(α∗α+ β∗β) = − 2 sin θA sin(4x− θA ± θB)
sin(2x− θA) sin(2x− θA ± θB) .
Among the possible P for which the method applies
are the probability distributions which lead to maximal
violation of a CHSH inequality. The corresponding rep-
resentations are given by θA = θB = pi/2 and ψ = φ±x
with x = pi/8 + npi/4 (n = 0, 1, 2, 3).
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